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individual a person who can have legal rights? (3) Has this person interests which
the law will protect?
If we concede a wrong we can hardly deny a remedy. If the plaintiff has suffered
injuries and can prove that they were the result of the defendant's tortious action he
should be able to recover his damages. 19 David Dibble.
TORTS: LABiUiTY iN AVIATION ACCIDENT CASS.-In the recent case of United
States v. Kesinger,' a federal court has seen fit to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
to a case where an airplane crash caused damage to property on the ground.2
In the instant case, the plaintiff brought an action to recover damages for the destruc-
tion of a barn and milk house caused by the crash of an Army Air Force B-17 shortly
after it had taken off. Two theories of liability were advanced by the plaintiff. One,
absolute liability regardless of fault when an accident occurred in the pursuit of an
extra-hazardous activity; and two, negligence. The trial court found the pilot had been
guilty of negligence in flying his airplane too low, thereby making the United States
liable under the Federal Torts Claim Act.3 The court approved this finding, saying,
"The modern trend of authority is to hold the rule of res ipsa loquitur applicable
under the facts and circumstances presented in the instant case." 4
The leading case applying strict liability to a case involving an airplane crash is
Rochester Gas and Electric Corp. v. Dunlop.5 In that case, the plaintiff was the owner
of an electric transmission line supported by a steel tower which was damaged when
the defendant's airplane struck it in an unsuccessful attempt to land. The plaintiff
sought to recover on the basis of negligence, contending the theory of res ipsa loquitur
was applicable. Held, on appeal, that the cause of action upon the ground of negli-
gence was properly dismissed by the lower court. The court went on to allow the
plaintiff recovery on the basis of an "inexcusable trespass," pointing out that when
damage occurs in an aviation accident the party who brought about the chance occur-
rence should bear the burden. This traditional view of strict liability is also embodied
in the Restatement of Torts characterizing aviation as an "ultrahazardous instru-
mentality." O
"It is suggested that the problem of prenatal personality could he avoided by looking at the
problem as merely one of causation of injury to a child living after birth. Suppose A left explosives
negligently in B's house before C was born. After C's birth the explosives blew up and injured C.
Would A be able to avoid responsibility by pleading that C had no personality at the time of A's
negligent act? No case has taken this approach but it is an interesting possibility.
1190 F. 2d 529 (Kan., 1951).
'Res ipsa loquitur creates a rebuttable presumption that the defendant was negligent. The
presumption arises upon proof that the accident was one which ordinarily does not occur in the
absence of someone's negligence; that the accident was caused by an instrumentality within the
exclusive control of the defendant; and, it was not due to any voluntary action on the part of the
plaintiff. See Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P. 2d 687 (1944).
828 U. S. C. A. 1346, 2671.
'United States v. Kesinger, supra note 1.
'266 N. Y. S. 469, 148 Misc. 849 (1933). In this case Judge Lynn made the now famous state-
ment, "To hold that the defendant here is absolved from liability, because he was himself free
from negligence, is to hazard all the chimneys in the land, as well as the live stock on the farms,
and even the people in their homes."
"REsTATEMENT, TORTS, § 520, comment B (1934), states "Thus, aviation in its present stage of
development is ultrahazardous because even the best constructed and maintained aeroplane is so
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The case for strict liability as applied to airplane crashes has traditionally rested
upon the social policy calling for compensation to the innocent party who has suffered
damage through no fault of his own.7 The theory of strict liability has appeared
particularly apropos in aviation crash cases since there is little mutuality between the
risks and advantages inherent in a situation where the airplane is operating in the air
for its own commercial gain and the injured party is engaged in passive activity on
the ground below. The defendant, who is reaping the advantages of carrying on a
commercial enterprise, is deemed to be in a better position to administer the risk
by passing it on to the public as an incident to its cost of operations than is the
innocent victim.8 On the other hand, the theory of negligence has been used for a
number of years in cases involving passenger fatalities.' In such cases, both the
passenger and the aviation industry are enjoying the advantages of air travel and both
parties are required to bear the risk of loss in the absence of negligence. It is, there-
fore, incumbent on the injured party in aviation passenger cases to prove negligence in
order to recover. Res ipsa loquitur is often used as the means of establishing a prima
facie inference of negligence which the defendant airline must rebut.' 0
The question which now presents itself is whether or not the Kesinger case pur-
ports to change any of the existing law governing aviation accident cases? Has the
Kesinger case indicated a trend toward the use of negligence as the proper theory to
invoke in the case of an airplane crash which causes property damage? On close
analysis it is submitted that the facts presented in the Kesinger case merely tend to
show that since the court was able to find the pilot had been negligent in the opera-
tions of the airplane, the court was content to allow the plaintiff recovery on the ground
of negligence without the necessity of relying on strict liability. Having found such
negligence, the court merely refused to discuss the strict liability allegation saying,
"We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the other theory of liability advanced." These
words do not tend to warrant any implication that the theory of strict liability is no
longer applicable to property damage cases caused by an airplane crash. On the
contrary, the language used shows the court's inclination to allow the plaintiff recovery
when negligence has been established and as an alternative the court indicates it would
have granted compensation for damages on the theory of strict liability if the plaintiff
had failed to prove such negligence.
It would be an unreasonable extension of the actual decision of the principal case
if it were to be considered as indicative of a proposition requiring proof of negligence
by the plaintiff in order to recover in every case wherein an airplane crash has caused
property damage. Suffice it to say that the plaintiff is at liberty to prove negligence on
the part of the aircraft, but he is not deprived of his long established right to use the
theory of strict liability as a means of obtaining relief for the loss he suffers when an
airplane disrupts his peaceful domain.
Howard McKissick.
Howard Swanson.
incapable of complete control that flying creates a risk that the plane even though carefully
constructed, maintained and operated, may crash to the injury of persons, structures, and chattels
on the land over which the flight is made."
'The earliest case is believed to be Guille v. Swan, 19 Johnson 381 (N. Y. 1822), where a
balloonist landed in the plaintiff's garden and it, together with the crowd attracted by the unusual
event, caused damage to the vegetables. See LUPTON, CIVIL AVIATION LAW (1st ed., 1935) 110.
'PRossER ON TORTS (1st ed., 1941) See. 56.
'The most recent case being Johnson v. Eastern Air Lines, 177 F. 2d 713 (1951).
"McLarty, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Air Line Passenger Litigation, 37 VA. L. REV. 55 (1951). The
author points out that res ipsa loquitur has found its way into 24 aviation cases for establishing
passenger fatality claims and 22 have been decided by the jury in favor of the defendant airlines.
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TORTS: LIABILITY OF CHARITABLE CoRPORATIoNs.-As the result of an auto
accident in San Mateo, in the summer of 1943, caused by the negligence of one who
was regarded as its authorized agent, the Presbytery of San Francisco was held to be
liable.' This decision tore down the last barrier in California shielding charitable
corporations from liability for their torts, the plaintiff in this case being a nonpaying
beneficiary of the Presbytery's San Mateo Mission Bible School. Former decisions
had set down the California rule that charitable corporations were liable only to
strangers and paying beneficiaries.
An examination of the trend illustrated by California decisions for the past forty
years is helpful in determining the reasons which caused this last barrier to fall.
The foundation of immunity in this country is the dictum of Lord Cottenlam
in the Feoffes of Heriots Hospital v. Ross:2
"To give damages out of a trust fund would not be to apply it to those objects
whom the author of the fund had in view, but would be to divert it to a completely
different purpose."
The action was for damages for wrongful exclusion from the benefits of the
charity, not for personal injury inflicted in its operation. This dictum was made law
in a subsequent case,3 but was overruled some ten years later.4
Evidently unaware that the Heriot case had been overruled, Massachusetts fol-
lowed it in 1876, 5 and Maryland followed suit some nine years later.6
After these two states adopted the immunity concept, the immunity of the trust
fund itself was extended by other states to include the immunity of charitable corpora-
tions as well.
Dictum found in the first California case in point7 stated that if one accepts the
benefit of a public or private charity, the beneficiary exempts by implied contract
the charity for torts committed by servants, if the charity has used due care in the
selection of its servants. In the opinion of this case a Rhode Island decision was cited,8
such decision furnishing the basis for the California rule, holding the Salvation Army
liable for the negligent operation of one of its wagons engaged in charitable work,
even though the charity had used due care in the selection of its servants. By the
Thomas case, which indicated California law on the point, paying and nonpaying
beneficiaries were precluded from recovery against a charity, but strangers could
recover upon the showing of negligent conduct of servants.
In 1918, a paying patient of a charitable hospital was denied relief against the
hospital for injury caused by acts of negligent nurses, 9 thus declaring the dictum of
the Thomas case as the law in California.
Nine years later the Salvation Army was held liable to a third person stranger
who was injured through the negligence of a servant of the Army engaged in
charitable work. 10
Charitable corporations in California, realizing their liability to strangers,
'Malloy v. Fong, 37 A. C. 356, 232 P. 2d 241 (1951).
'12 Clark and Fin. 507, 513, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846).
'Holliday v. St. Leonard, 11 C. B. (N. S.) 192 (1861).
'Foreman v. Mayor of Canterbury, L. R. 6 Q. B. 214 (1871).
'McDonald v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432 (1876).
'Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20 (1885).
"Thomas v. German General Benevolent Society, 168 Cal. 183, 141 Pac. 1186 (1914).8Basabo v. Salvation Army, 35 R. L 22, 85 AtL 120 (1912).9Burdell v. St. Luke's Hospital, 37 C. A. 310, 173 Pac. 1008 (1918).
"
0Phoenix Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Salvation Army, 83 Cal. App. 455,256 Pac. 1106 (1927).
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strangers usually being defined to include employees and third persons other than
beneficiaries or patients, began to insure themselves against liability for the negligence
of their servants. In a case involving a hospital," it was ruled, by the way of non-
admissibility of such evidence, that the fact that a charitable corporation took out
insurance to remedy injured parties did not alter the status of the charity to that of
a business for profit.
Naturally the question arose in many instances, just what constitutes a charitable
corporation? The question is answered by stating that the burden rests upon the
defendant to prove its charitable character and its consequent exemption from liability
for the negligence of its servants. 12
In 1939, two cases were decided, both involving hospitals. In each the patient
had been injured by the negligence of servants of the charitable hospitals, both patients
were paying patients, and in each recovery was allowed the patients. 13 The court said
in the Silva case, "the implied contract doctrine has been used to rationalize a result
and is not based upon the intention of the parties, as legal principles require." Thus
by these two cases California law allowed recovery to paying beneficiaries, directly
overruling Burdell v. St. Luke's Hospital,14 taking the view that if a charity wanted to
aid an individual, it ought to be required to exercise due care in such aid.
Thus far we have traced the subject from California's first stand, namely, recovery
to an injured stranger as against the charity, to the point where the Silva and England
cases declare that recovery may be had by a paying beneficiary as well.
The only remaining class of persons who could not recover against charitable
corporations was taken under the fold of Justice Rutledge:' 5
"Abolition of the immunity as to the paying patient is justified as the last short
step but one to extinction. Retention for the non-paying patient is the least defensible
and most unfortunate of the distinction's refinement. He, least of all, is able to bear
the burden. More than all others, he has no choice. He is the last person the donor
would want to go without indemnity. With everyone else protected, the additional
burden of protecting him cannot break the trust. He should be the first to have repara-
tion, not last and least among those who receive it. So stripped of foundation, the
distinction fails. It should fall in line with, not away from, the trend which has
brought it about. The immunity should go and the object of the charity should be
placed on a par with all others."
When the principal case under discussion was decided, the court quoted the
preceding language of Justice Rufledge, and must have felt the time had come to
properly state the law in California. In order to justify the inclusion of nonpaying
beneficiaries with paying beneficiaries in allowing recovery, this rationalization was
resorted to:
"If the theories discussed and discarded by this court in the Silva and England
cases do not justify immunity from liability in the case of a paying beneficiary, there
is no logical justification for clinging to them in the case of the beneficiary who does
not pay."
Most of the cases which have arisen involving negligence actions against charities
have had to do with hospitals. These institutions look after the physical side of the
"Stonaker v. Big Sisters Hospital, 116 CaL App. 375, 2 P. 2d 520 (1931).
"Inderbitzen v. Lane Hospital, 124 Cal. App. 462, 13 P. 2d 905 (1932).
"Silva v. Providence Hospital, 14 Cal. 2d 762 (776), 97 P. 2d 798 (1939); England v. Hos-
pital of the Good Samaritan, 14 CaL 2d 791, 97 P. 2d 813 (1939).
"37 Cal. App. 310, 173 Pac. 1008 (1918).
"'President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F. 2d 810, 827 (D. C. Cir. 1942).
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person. The question might arise, should there be, or has there been a distinction
drawn between those institutions which look after an individual's physical side, and
those which look after his spiritual side? As evidenced by the principal case, the
answer seems to be no. In a recent Vermont case,1 no such distinction was even
hinted at, the court discarding the trust fund theory and holding the church liable for
the negligence of its servants.
By the decision in the principal case, California is now in step with a trend which
is evidencing itself with increasing strength throughout the country,-namely, to hold
charitable corporations liable for their torts, regardless of the status of the victim
injured.17
A logical justification for this trend is due to many factors, each adding its
relative weight. Considering that the doctrine of immunity in this country was based
upon an English decision which had, at the time it was cited, been overruled in
England, the courts of this country in attempting to rationally justify the result, found
its basis devoid of logical legal principles, and sound social reasoning.
The extension of workmen's compensation acts and social security legislation to
include the employees of charitable corporations bears much weight upon the result.
Also charities may today, due to the wide extension of insurance coverage, obtain
liability insurance for a relatively small fee. The growing population of the country,
with consequent crowding of conditions, undoubtedly causes more accidents, with more
charities being involved due to the increased volume. As immunity is the exception,
with more injured victims, the immunity should and has withered considerably. People
today frequent hospitals, a large portion of them being charitable, more often than
they did fifty years ago, not necessarily because there are more sick people, but because
there are more facilities to handle the normal rate of sick people, due to increased
living standards. Hence with a greater volume, more people are injured; the cry
for recovery becomes louder, and the effect upon the concept of immunity can readily
be seen.
The anomaly of exempting charitable corporations and trust funds, while indi-
viduals performing charity are not exempt, is a distinction which is not justifiable
by logical reasoning, and should fall.
William Dannemeyer.
"Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Vermont, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A. 2d 230 (1950).17Mlutliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein, 144 Minn. 392, 175 N. W. 699 (1920) ; Tucker
v. Mobile Infirmary Assn., 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915) ; City of Shawnee v. Roush, 101 Okla. 60,
223 Pac. 354 (1923).

